Samuel J. Abrams
Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University and a research associate with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Sam is also co-author with Morris P. Fiorina and Jeremy C. Pope, of "Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America"  

(Don’t miss our interview with Sam Abrams, Wednesday December 22nd, 2004 at 5:00 PM EST) 

The days following the 2004 Presidential election left blue state residents in a state of shock. Feelings of betrayal, anger, astonishment and despair pervaded the minds of blue state voters who all wondered, "What happened?" Given the perceptions of a continued poor economy, many questions surrounding Iraq and the war on terror, low Presidential job approval, and general dissatisfaction with the way things were going in the United States- it only seemed natural to many that Kerry would have an easy time in winning the White House.

The strong Bush showing and multitude of Republican victories around the nation, however, left pundits, partisans, and blabocrats scrambling for answers. Not only was an explanation of the Presidential outcome necessary, but also an elucidation as to why it appeared that the Democratic Party floundered and forgot the meaning of "a party of the people."

What happened next serves as a textbook example the power of the press as columnists and commentators unleashed a damaging and misleading story on the nation: President Bush won re-election on "moral values" and the associated rise of religion.

The spin-machines began to whirl. Social conservatives triumphantly pronounced that the electorate had rejected the pro-choice, pro-gay liberal agenda of the Democrats while the liberal commentators bitterly agreed. Certainly, it appeared from these accounts as if the "right nation" had finally emerged to show its true colors and that the country was moving in a more religious direction.

To be sure, the poorly written, National Election Pool exit-poll item that was over-interpreted in the heated context of same-sex marriage prohibitions passing in 11 states suggested such a shift. When asked the single most important issue underlying their vote, 22% of those responding in the exit poll chose "moral values"- a proxy for religion- from the list they were offered. Given sampling error, this number is statistically indistinguishable from the 20% who chose the economy and jobs, or the 19% who chose terrorism.

It certainly appeared as if religion was a key factor in the election and that this moral move was being lead by the right toward the Republican Party. As a result, statements are presently flying around suggesting that the Democratic Party is "lost in America" and calls for the party to move toward religion and more to right are now regularly made.

While it is certainly the case the Democratic Party would be better served by developing a clear and credible alternative set of issue positions to the Republican Party and improve its national organizational infrastructure, the "moral values" and religious story is simply incorrect. Although the United States is a fairly pious country when compared to other nations around the globe, the United States is no more religious today than it was two or three decades ago. Moreover, religiosity does not break down along the lines of the often-cited, poorly conceived Red and Blue state dichotomy.

Today, roughly 32% of Americans attend religious services regularly and almost 70% of Americans consider religion to be an important part of their lives. As for guidance in day-to-day living, 35% of Americans believe that religion offers some guidance while roughly 50% maintain that their religion offers quite a bit or a great deal of guidance in their daily matters. Data from the 1970s and 1980s reveal virtually no change in American religious thought and practice. 37% of Americans went to church at least once a week or more in the 1970s and 1980s. Roughly 77% of Americans felt that religion was an important piece of their lives. 40% thought that religion provides some guidance while approximately 57% held that their religion offers quite a bit or a great deal of guidance in their affairs. If nothing else, the data clearly illustrate that there has been a slight decline in religious sentiment and that the United States has not become more religious over the past decade or so.

While there has indeed been a slight turn down in American religiosity, many argue that America is deeply divided and religion is a key indicator. That is, while American religiosity may have diminished nationally- significant religious divisions emerge if examined through the overly simple lens of Red and Blue America. Such an idea is incorrect and looking at America through the Red-Blue distinction reveals that religious preferences are not diverging, but converging.

Regular church attendance in Red States is analogous to Blue States with 35% attending church once a week or more in Red States compared to 29% in Blue States. 70% of Red State residents consider religion to be an important part of their lives compared to 63% of Blue State residents. Finally, 33% of Red Staters assert that religion provides a great deal of guidance and 24% posit quite a bit of guidance in their day-to-day living and 23%. Blue Staters look virtually identical with 27% stating a great deal of guidance and 20% quite a bit of guidance. Although there are some slight differences, these differences are not particularly large. If Red states have become redder and blue states bluer since 2000 as many have argued, one would expect to find substantial differences between the Red and Blue states. These differences simply do not exist.

There has not been a rise in religiosity in the United States over the past decade, nor is there a Red-Blue divide. Rather, greater visibility of the religious community and particularly from the right side of the political spectrum has been a hallmark of the last election cycle. Right leaning, "moral values" toting partisans are well organized and have a clear message. They mobilized their base and turned out the vote on Election Day. While the Democrats engaged in massive voter registration efforts, they did not present credible alternatives to the Republican Party and survey data reveals that many felt that Kerry’s strongest attribute was that he was simply not Bush.

Nonetheless, media coverage continues to give the appearance that the Democratic Party was out of touch with reality, while constantly suggesting that Karl Rove did indeed have his finger on the pulse of America. A recent Los Angeles Times exit-poll reveals, however, that the Democrats and Republicans essentially tied on the issue of religion and morality. One item asked what voters liked most about their choice for president. Of Bush voters, 55% chose "strong leader" while only 24% chose "shares my values." 21% of Kerry voters offered "shares my values" and highest categorical response was 26% who for "cares about people like me." Had the pundits and media seen these numbers first, the story of the election may have been about leadership and character, not moral values and religion.

None of this is intended to suggest that religion and moral values are not important. They are of great importance to some Americans. But those who wish to wage a holy war over the specific issues of abortion and same-sex marriage are small in number and there is no evidence that their number is growing. Well over 100 million eligible voters still did not vote and participation was not at all-time high- despite the perceived salience of the election. Even so, the misplaced debate over the "moral values" and religion story line underlies a serious problem for the Democrats, a problem that stands in the way of winning national elections- namely a clear choice.

The Democrats need to win on issues - not by shifting to the right. For a political future, the Democratic Party must define itself through credible alternatives, provide real choice, coordinate nationally, and embrace its historical legacy as "the party of the people."

Samuel J. Abrams is a research fellow with the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University and a research associate with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is the co-author, with Morris P. Fiorina and Jeremy C. Pope, of "Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America" (Longman, January 2005)